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INTRODUCTION
On March 18, 1999, Vernon Woods placed a 911 call after his
five-week-old son, who suffered from cerebral palsy, became
unresponsive. 1 The infant died six months later. 2 One possible
explanation for the infant’s death, which the deputy medical examiner
would have testified to at trial, was that he died from water on the
brain as a result of blunt force head trauma. 3 Woods claimed,
however, that he accidentally dropped the baby and shook him “in an
effort to revive him.” 4 Woods pled guilty to involuntary manslaughter
in 2001. 5 Woods already had a 1993 conviction for possession of
cocaine with intent to distribute. 6
On November 16, 2007, Woods was again before the court for
two counts of distributing ecstasy and one count of possession of a
weapon by a felon. 7 The district court found Woods to be a career
*J.D. Candidate, May 2010, Chicago-Kent College of Law, Illinois Institute of
Technology; B.A., 2007, Loyola University Chicago.
1
United States v. Woods, 576 F.3d 400, 402 (7th Cir. 2009).
2
Id.
3
Id.
4
Id.
5
Id. at 401.
6
Id.
7
Id.
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offender, and sentenced him to 192 months of imprisonment. 8 On
appeal, Woods challenged his sentence, claiming that the involuntary
manslaughter conviction was not a “crime of violence” within the
meaning of the United States Sentencing Guidelines (“USSG” or “the
Guidelines”). 9 In a surprising result, the Seventh Circuit agreed. 10
Accordingly, the court found that Woods was not a career offender
under the Guidelines, and reduced his 192-month sentence to a mere
84 months. 11
How can such a result make sense? In other words, as the dissent
in Woods argued, how can homicide not be a violent felony? 12 As this
article will demonstrate, the answer lies in the line of sentencing cases
the United States Supreme Court has recently decided. 13 In particular,
the Supreme Court stated in United States v. Begay that a predicate
offense has to be “purposeful, violent, and aggressive” in order to be
considered for sentence enhancement (the “Begay test”). 14 While each
of the elements in the Begay test requires its own analysis, such
considerations are beyond the scope of this article. Instead, this article
will focus on the first requirement, purposefulness.
In looking at the mens rea of Illinois’s involuntary manslaughter
statute, the Seventh Circuit came to the conclusion that Woods had not
acted purposefully when he caused the death of his son. 15 In other
words, the court held that, because Woods was convicted under a
statute that only required a mens rea of recklessness, his conduct was
not purposeful. 16
The question then becomes whether a defendant who acts under a
mens rea of recklessness can ever be considered to have acted
8

Id. at 402.
Id.
10
Id. at 413.
11
Id. at 401.
12
Id. at 414 (Easterbrook, C.J., dissenting).
13
See generally Chambers v. United States, 129 S. Ct. 687 (2009); Begay v.
United States, 128 S. Ct. 1581 (2008); James v. United States, 550 U.S. 192 (2007);
Shepard v. United States, 544 U.S. 13 (2005).
14
128 S. Ct. at 1586.
15
Woods, 576 F.3d at 411.
16
Id. at 412–413.
9
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purposefully. While the answer may seem obvious at first glance, a
review of the existing case law reveals that the question is much more
convoluted than one might first surmise. 17 This article explores
different approaches courts have taken when analyzing whether a prior
conviction was purposeful under the Begay test. Ultimately, it
concludes that the Seventh Circuit’s approach to purposefulness, while
grounded in solid legal reasoning, is incompatible with the goals of the
Guidelines and should be abandoned. 18
Part I of this article provides the necessary background on
sentencing enhancements. First, it considers the legislative history of
the Armed Career Criminal Act (the “ACCA”) and the USSG to
determine the goals of the two provisions. 19 Then, the article reviews
the Court’s decisions that have interpreted the “violent felony” or
“crime of violence” phrase of the ACCA and USSG. Next, it provides
an in-depth examination of the Seventh Circuit’s decision in U.S. v.
Woods. Part II compares the Seventh Circuit’s approach to analyzing
purposefulness to the approaches adopted by the other federal circuits.
Finally, Part III argues that a mens rea approach to purposefulness
defeats Congress’s goals of neutralizing violent, repeat offenders and
enhancing uniformity in sentencing. This article concludes that judges
should have more discretion to consult the record of conviction during

17

See discussion infra Part II.
See discussion infra Part III.
19
While there are differences between the USSG and the ACCA, the similarity
in language between the two provisions led courts to hold that an interpretation of
one is also applicable to the other. See, e.g., James v. United States, 550 U.S. 192,
206 (2007) (noting that “definition of a predicate ‘crime of violence’ closely tracks
ACCA’s definition of ‘violent felony.’”); United States v. Daye, 571 F.3d 225, 236
(2d Cir. 2009) (court used case law interpreting § 4B.1 to support its interpretation of
ACCA); United States v. Harrison, 558 F.3d 1280, 1291–92 (11th Cir. 2009) (court
used prior decision interpreting a crime of violence under the Guidelines to support
interpretation of ACCA); United States v. Johnson, 417 F.3d 990, 996–97 (8th Cir.
2005), abrogated on other grounds by Begay, 128 S. Ct. 1581 (“The statutory
definition of ‘violent felony’ is viewed as interchangeable with the guidelines
definition of ‘crime of violence.’ Therefore, in determining whether a defendant
qualifies as an armed career criminal under the ACCA, we are also bound by case
law defining a crime of violence under § 4B1.2.”).
18
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sentencing so that they can determine whether the defendant acted
purposefully.
I. BACKGROUND
A. The History of the ACCA and USSG
Although this article treats the USSG and the ACCA as one and
the same for the purposes of statutory interpretation, it is important to
note the differences between the two with regard to their creation,
functions, and overall purpose. Understanding the goals behind the
creation of the USSG and the ACCA will help when determining
whether the Seventh Circuit reached the right decision in Woods.
1. The Armed Career Criminal Act
The ACCA is a federal statute that requires an automatic 15 year
minimum sentence for anyone who violates 18 U.S.C. 922(g) 20 and
has three prior convictions for violent felonies or serious drug
offenses. 21 As opposed to the Guidelines, the ACCA is specifically
concerned with the “special danger” posed by career criminals
carrying guns. 22
Congress passed the ACCA in 1984 as part of an overall revamp
of federal criminal legislation during the Reagan administration. 23
This movement was inspired by research that had come out of the
1970s and 1980s that demonstrated that a large number of crimes were
20

18 U.S.C. § 922(g) is the statute that prohibits certain individuals such as
convicted felons, illegal aliens, and military personnel discharged under
dishonorable conditions from transporting or possessing firearms. 18 U.S.C.
§ 922(g) (2006).
21
18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(1) (2006).
22
United States v. Sylvester, 620 F. Supp. 2d 642, 649 n.3 (M.D. Pa. 2009)
(citing Begay v. United States, 128 S. Ct. 1581, 1587 (2008)).
23
See Tracey A. Basler, Note, Does “Any” Mean “All” or Does “Any” Mean
“Some”? An Analysis of the “Any Court” Ambiguity of the Armed Career Criminal
Act and Whether Foreign Convictions Count as Predicate Convictions, 37 NEW
ENG. L. REV. 147, 173–74 (2002).
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committed by a small group of repeat offenders. 24 Thus, the goal
behind the ACCA was “[to] incapacitate the truly dangerous
criminal.” 25
Senator Specter originally introduced the Career Criminal Life
Sentence Act, the predecessor to the ACCA, in 1981. 26 In its original
form, the Career Criminal Life Sentence Act authorized the federal
prosecution of a criminal defendant accused of committing a robbery
or burglary who had already been convicted twice for robbery or
burglary under state law. 27 The Career Criminal Life Sentence Act
was vetoed in 1983 due to federalism concerns. 28
The bill was reintroduced in 1984 and Congressman William
Hughes, then-Chairman of the Subcommittee on Crime, proposed an
amendment that would allow the bill to be approved:
Congressman Hughes’s amendment significantly changed the
legislation. To address the federalism concerns, it eliminated
the creation of federal jurisdiction over local robberies and
burglaries by repeat offenders. Instead of expanding federal
jurisdiction, the amendment created a sentence enhancement
for repeat offenders convicted of violating a preexisting
federal law. More specifically, the amendment created a
mandatory minimum sentence of fifteen years or
imprisonment for offenders previously convicted three of
more times of robbery or burglary who violate the federal law
prohibiting felons from possessing, receiving, or transporting
firearms. The subcommittee accepted this amendment, and
the amended bill was passed into law as the Armed Career
Criminal Act of 1984. 29
24

James G. Levine, Note, The Armed Career Criminal Act and the U.S.
Sentencing Guidelines: Moving Toward Consistency, 46 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 537,
545 (2009).
25
134 CONG. REC. 15, 806–07 (1988) (statement of Sen. Specter).
26
Levine, supra note 24, at 546.
27
Id.
28
Id.
29
Id. at 546–47.
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Thus, in 1984 the primary concern of Congress was to
“incapacitate career criminals” which was done by targeting those
individuals who frequently robbed or burglarized. 30 The violent felony
provision was not added until 1986, which “allowed for incapacitating
a wider variety of career criminals than just robbers and burglars” by
adding more crimes that would qualify as predicate offenses. 31
Ultimately, then, it can be concluded that one of the primary purposes
behind the ACCA was to keep violent, repeat offenders off the streets.
2. The United States Sentencing Guidelines
The Guidelines are standards set forth by the United States
Sentencing Commission (“the Commission”) that district courts use
when sentencing offenders. 32 Although the Guidelines are advisory, a
sentencing court must properly apply the Guidelines before imposing a
sentence on the defendant. 33
Under USSG §4B1.1, a defendant can be deemed a career
offender if (1) he was 18 at the time he committed the offense for
which he is being sentenced (2) the offense for which he is being
sentenced is either a crime of violence or a controlled substances
offense and (3) he or she has two prior convictions for crimes of
violence or controlled substances offenses. 34 Thus, the Guidelines
differ from the ACCA in that only two prior convictions are needed
for sentence enhancement and the crime before the court must be
either a crime of violence or a controlled substance offense, as
opposed to a violation of the firearm statute. 35

30

Id. at 547.
Id.
32
See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL ch. 1, pt. A, subpt. 2 (2009).
33
See id.; United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 264 (2005).
34
U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 4B1.1 (2009).
35
Compare id. with 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(1) (2006).
31
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Prior to the adoption of the Guidelines, judges had wide
discretion with regard to sentencing. 36 This was, in part, because
sentencing was based on a “medical” model where sentences were
supposed to be “individualized,” like medical treatment, so that a
criminal defendant’s particular social disability could be treated. 37
However, this individualized model fell out of favor as a result of
“rising crime, mounting evidence that prisoners were not being
rehabilitated, and increasing concern that indeterminate sentencing
produced unjust disparities between similarly situated offenders.” 38
As opposed to the ACCA, which Congress created, the
Commission creates and updates the Guidelines. 39 The Commission
was created pursuant to the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 (“the
SRA”). 40 Congress decided to create this agency because “(1) the
previously unfettered sentencing discretion accorded federal trial
judges needed to be structured; (2) the administration of punishment
needed to be more certain; and (3) specific offenders (e.g. white collar
and violent, repeat offenders) needed to be targeted for more serious
penalties.” 41
The Commission is “an independent agency in the judicial branch
of government.” 42 It is charged with:
(1) establish[ing] sentencing policies and practices for the
Federal criminal justice system that—
(A) assure the meeting of the purposes of sentencing. . . 43
36

See Stanley A. Weigel, The Sentencing Reform Act of 1984: A Practical
Appraisal, 36 UCLA L. REV. 83, 89 (1988).
37
Frank O. Bowman, III, The Failure of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines: A
Structural Analysis, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 1315, 1321 (2005).
38
Id. at 1322.
39
See UNITED STATES SENTENCING COMMISSION, AN OVERVIEW OF THE
UNITED STATES SENTENCING COMMISSION, 2–3
http://www.ussc.gov/general/USSCoverview.pdf (last visited Oct. 7, 2009).
40
Id. at 1.
41
Id. at 1–2.
42
Id. at 1.
43
The goals of sentencing are just punishment, deterrence, incapacitation, and
rehabilitation. 18 U.S.C.A. § 3553(a)(2) (2006).
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(B) provide certainty and fairness in meeting the purposes of
sentencing, avoiding unwarranted sentencing disparities
among defendants with similar records who have been found
guilty of similar criminal conduct while maintaining
sufficient flexibility to permit individualized sentences when
warranted by mitigating or aggravating factors not taken into
account in the establishment of general sentencing practices;
and
(C) reflect, to the extent practicable, advancement in
knowledge of human behavior as it relates to the criminal
justice process. 44
The first set of sentencing guidelines went into effect November
1, 1987. 45 The most recent amendments to the guidelines went into
effect November 1, 2009. 46
Overall, then, the purpose of the Guidelines was to increase
uniformity in sentencing and, like the ACCA, increase the punishment
for repeat offenders. However, in sentencing defendants under the
Guidelines, federal courts must also be mindful of the Supreme
Court’s interpretation of “violent felony” or “crime of violence.”
B. The Supreme Court’s Interpretation of the “Violent Felony” or
“Crime of Violence” Definition
Both the ACCA and the USSG define a “violent felony” or a
“crime of violence” as one that “(1) has as an element the use,
attempted use, or threatened use of force against the person of another,
or (2) is burglary of a dwelling, arson, or extortion, involves the use of
explosives, or otherwise involves conduct that presents a serious

44

28 U.S.C.A. § 991(b) (West 2008).
UNITED STATES SENTENCING COMMISSION, AN OVERVIEW OF THE UNITED
STATES SENTENCING COMMISSION 2,
http://www.ussc.gov/general/USSCoverview.pdf (last visited Oct. 7, 2009).
46
United States Sentencing Commission, Federal Sentencing Guidelines
Manuals, http://www.ussc.gov/guidelin.htm (last visited Dec. 1, 2009).
45
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potential risk of physical injury to another.” 47 Because the language of
18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B) and § 4B1.2(a) is identical, courts have
considered case law interpreting one statutory provision to be a
persuasive, if not binding, interpretation of the other. 48
In United States v. Taylor, the Court confronted the problem of
defining burglary for purposes of sentence enhancement under the
ACCA. 49 In Taylor, the Supreme Court held that courts should adopt a
“categorical approach” when sentencing a defendant, meaning that
courts should not consider the individual facts of a defendant’s crime
but should only look at the fact that a conviction occurred and the
elements of the offense. 50 However, the Taylor Court modified this
categorical approach by recognizing that, in certain cases, a sentencing
court would be permitted to consult the record of conviction for
purposes of sentence enhancement. 51
Shepard v. United States refined this analysis by limiting the
modified categorical approach. 52 In Shepard, the issue was whether a
sentencing court could consult police reports and complaint
applications for purposes of applying the sentence enhancement under
the ACCA. 53 The Court held that the sentencing court may only
consult “the terms of the charging document, the terms of a plea
agreement or transcript of a colloquy between judge and defendant in
which the factual basis for the plea was confirmed by the defendant, or
to some comparable judicial record of this information.” 54 The Court
reasoned that to hold otherwise would undermine Taylor and would
lead collateral trials taking place during the sentencing phase of a
trial. 55

47

18 U.S.C § 924(e)(2)(B) (2006); U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL
§ 4B1.2(a) (2009).
48
See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
49
See 495 U.S. 575, 578 (1990).
50
Id. at 602.
51
See id.
52
544 U.S. 13, 26 (2005).
53
Id. at 16.
54
Id. at 26.
55
Id. at 23.
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In James v. United States, the Court specifically focused on the
“residual clause” of the ACCA and USSG. 56 In James, the question
before the Court was whether attempted burglary presented enough of
a serious potential risk of physical injury to qualify as a violent felony
under the ACCA. 57 Using the categorical approach, the Court
reasoned that the risk present in a burglary “arises not from the
completion of the burglary, but from the possibility that an innocent
person might appear while the crime is in progress.” 58 Thus, attempted
burglary presented the same degree of risk as that of a completed
burglary. 59
The defendant in James responded by arguing that under the
categorical approach, attempted burglary should not count as a
predicate offense “unless all cases [of attempted burglary] present
such a risk.” 60 While the Court acknowledged that some instances of
attempted burglary did not present a risk of physical harm to the
innocent victim, such as the burglary of an abandoned building, the
Court stressed the “ACCA does not require metaphysical certainty.
Rather, §924(e)(2)(B)(ii)’s residual provision speaks in terms of a
‘potential risk.’ These are inherently probabilistic concepts.” 61
Consequently, James stood for the proposition that a crime can qualify
as a predicate offense under the ACCA’s residual clause if “by its
nature” the crime involved serious potential risk to another.62
One year later, the Court decided Begay v. United States, where it
again considered whether an offense was a violent felony under the
residual clause of the ACCA. 63 Specifically, the Court determined
whether a felony offense for driving under the influence of alcohol

56

550 U.S. 192, 197 (2007). The residual clause is that part of the ACCA and
USSG that punishes crimes that “otherwise involves conduct that presents a serious
potential risk of physical injury or harm.” Id.
57
Id.
58
Id. at 203.
59
Id. at 203–04.
60
Id. at 207 (emphasis in original).
61
Id.
62
Id. at 209.
63
128 S. Ct. 1581, 1584–85 (2008).
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(DUI) posed the same degree of physical risk to an individual as
burglary, arson, extortion, or the use of explosives. 64
In reaching its conclusion that a DUI was not a violent felony
under the ACCA, the Court acknowledged that there was no doubt that
driving under the influence presented a serious physical risk to
another. 65 However, the Court reasoned that the enumerated list of
crimes in the statute meant that Congress only intended to include
similar crimes in the provision and not every crime that threatened to
injure another. 66 The Court then determined that a conviction for a
DUI differed from burglary, arson, etc. because the latter crimes
exhibited “purposeful, ‘violent, ‘and ‘aggressive’” behavior while the
former did not. 67 Specifically with regard to the purposeful
requirement, the Court emphasized:
In this respect . . . crimes involving intentional or purposeful
conduct (as in burglary and arson) are different than DUI, a
strict liability crime. In both instances, the offender’s prior
crimes reveal a degree of callousness toward risk, but in the
former instance they also show an increased likelihood that
the offender is the kind of person who might deliberately
point the gun and pull the trigger. We have no reason to
believe that Congress intended a 15-year mandatory prison
term where that increased likelihood does not exist. 68
Most recently, the Court decided United States v. Chambers in
which the Justices considered whether a defendant’s failure to report
to a penal institution was a violent felony under the ACCA. 69 In
Chambers, the Court dealt with an Illinois statute that criminalized
several different behaviors in one statute. 70 Specifically, the Illinois
64

Id.
Id. at 1584.
66
Id. at 1584–85.
67
Id. at 1586 (citations omitted).
68
Id. at 1587.
69
129 S. Ct. 687, 690 (2009).
70
Id. at 691.
65
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statute penalized (1) escape from a penal institution; (2) escape from
the custody of an employee of a penal institution; (3) failing to report
to a penal institution; (4) failing to report for periodic imprisonment;
(5) failing to return from furlough; (6) failing to return from work and
day release; and (7) failing to abide by the terms of home
confinement. 71
Noting that the categorical approach was not easy to apply in such
a situation, 72 the Court acknowledged that failure to report, as
identified in parts 3–6 of the statute, was different than the violent
behavior that usually accompanies an escape attempt. 73 Consequently,
the Justices decided to “treat the statute for ACCA purposes as
containing at least two separate crimes, namely escape from custody
on the one hand, and a failure to report on the other.” 74 Once the Court
was able to split the statute, it was fairly easy to decide that simply
failing to report for confinement was not the type of purposeful,
aggressive, and violent behavior that Congress intended to target with
the ACCA. 75
Since Begay, lower courts have struggled to define what is
“purposeful” under the ACCA or USSG. The easiest cases have been
when the predicate offense required a mens rea of either purpose or
knowledge. For example, in United State. v. Smith, the Third Circuit
held that holding a person in involuntary servitude met the Begay test
because the statute of conviction criminalized “knowingly . . .
hold[ing] another in a condition of involuntary servitude.” 76 Similarly,
in United States v. Billups, the Seventh Circuit found that false
imprisonment was a crime of violence because the Wisconsin statute
criminalized “intentionally confin[ing] or restrain[ing] another . . .

71

Id. (citing 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/31–6(a) (West 2009)).
Id. at 690.
73
Id. at 691.
74
Id.
75
See id. at 691–92.
76
284 Fed. App’x 943, 945 (3d Cir. 2008) (emphasis added) (citation omitted).
72
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without the person’s consent and with knowledge that he or she had no
lawful authority to do so.” 77
The more problematic cases have been when there was a mens rea
of recklessness or the statute made no mention of mens rea, making
the crime one of strict liability. 78 While these cases are discussed in
more detail below, for now it will suffice to state that courts have
either inferred that there was purposeful conduct, 79 held that there was
not purposeful conduct, 80 or remanded back to the lower court so that
the defendant’s conduct could be determined. 81
C. The Seventh Circuit’s Interpretation of “Purposeful” in Woods
In Woods, the defendant was convicted of two counts of
distributing ecstasy and one count of unlawful possession of a weapon,
which were all violations of federal law. 82 Woods pled guilty, and the
Probation Service recommended an enhanced sentence due to (1)
Wood’s 1993 conviction for possession of cocaine and (2) a 2001
conviction for involuntary manslaughter. 83 In his appeal, Woods
successfully argued that the involuntary manslaughter conviction was
not a crime of violence under the Guidelines. 84 Importantly, because
the opinion departed from the Seventh Circuit’s previous approaches
to the ACCA and USSG, it was circulated to the full court for approval
before being released. 85
77

536 F.3d 574, 577 (7th Cir. 2008) (citing WIS. STAT. ANN. § 940.30 (West
2008)) (emphasis added).
78
See discussion infra Part II.
79
See, e.g., United States v. Dates, No. 06-0083, 2008 WL 2620162, at *5–6
(W.D. Pa. Jun. 30, 2008) (holding that simple assault was a crime of violence
because it was similar to the enumerated offenses and “necessarily” involved
purposeful conduct).
80
See, e.g., United States v. Archer, 531 F.3d 1347 (11th Cir. 2008) (holding
that because the statute of conviction did not specify a mens rea, purposefulness
could not be shown).
81
See, e.g., United States v. Roseboro, 551 F.3d 226, 243 (4th Cir. 2009).
82
United States v. Woods, 576 F.3d 400, 401 (7th Cir. 2009).
83
Id.
84
See id. at 412–13.
85
See id. at 407.
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Judge Diane Wood, who authored the opinion, began her analysis
by stating that, under the categorical approach, the court was
precluded from looking into the details of the defendant’s guilty plea
to determine whether the crime of conviction was a crime of violence
under the Guidelines. 86 Judge Wood emphasized that, while courts
were permitted to consult additional materials under Shephard, these
materials could “be used only to determine which crime within a
statute the defendant committed, not how he committed that crime.” 87
The court then had to determine whether a conviction under
Illinois’s involuntary manslaughter statute constituted sufficiently
purposeful, aggressive, and violent behavior that posed a serious risk
of physical harm to another. 88 Illinois’s involuntary manslaughter
statute read:
A person who unintentionally kills an individual without
lawful justification commits involuntary manslaughter if his
acts whether lawful or unlawful which cause the death are
such as are likely to cause death or great bodily harm to some
individual, and he performs them recklessly. 89
In addition, “recklessness” was defined as:
A person is reckless or acts recklessly, when he consciously
disregards a substantial and unjustifiable risk that
circumstances exist or that a result will follow, described by
the statute defining the offense; and such disregard
constitutes a gross deviation from the standard of care which
a reasonable person would exercise in the situation. 90

86

Id. at 403–06.
Id. at 405.
88
Id. at 410.
89
720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/9–3(a) (West 2008) (amended 2009).
90
720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/4–6 (West 2009).
87
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Furthermore, the Seventh Circuit had decided United States v.
Smith only a year before. 91 In Smith, the defendant had two
convictions for criminal recklessness. 92 In considering whether a mens
rea of recklessness could qualify as a violent felony under Begay, the
Seventh Circuit focused on the examples the Court used of crimes that
were not committed by career criminals. 93 Specifically, the Seventh
Circuit noted that the Court used reckless tampering of consumer
products as an example on an unintentional act. 94 Looking at this
example, the Smith court followed Begay’s reasoning that while
reckless tampering with consumer products was “unquestionably
dangerous,” it “was ‘far removed’ from the ‘deliberate kind of
behavior associated with violent criminal use of firearms.” 95 The
Seventh Circuit also focused on the fact that the Court said all of the
enumerated offenses (i.e. burglary, arson, etc.) were intentional. 96
Thus, the Seventh Circuit concluded in Smith that crimes requiring
only a mens rea of recklessness cannot be considered violent felonies
under the ACCA. 97
In response to Smith, the Government in Woods argued that
Begay did not require that all crimes of recklessness be considered
non-violent. 98 The Government stated that Woods’s involuntary
manslaughter conviction should count as a crime of violence because
Woods had to consciously disregard the substantial harm that would
occur. 99 The Seventh Circuit explicitly rejected this argument by
responding that every reckless act begins with intentional behavior. 100
The court added “when pressed at oral argument to provide an
example of a situation where a defendant would be reckless with
91

Woods, 576 F.3d at 411; United States v. Smith, 544 F.3d 781, 782 (7th Cir.

2008).
92

Smith, 544 F.3d at 782.
Id. at 785.
94
Id.
95
Id. (citing Begay v. United States, 128 S. Ct. 1581, 1587 (7th Cir. 2008)).
96
Id.
97
Id. at 787.
98
United States v. Woods, 576 F.3d 400, 411 (7th Cir. 2009).
99
Id.
100
Id.
93
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regard to the outcome and not begin with an intentional act, the
Government could not provide one.” 101 Accordingly, because
Illinois’s involuntary manslaughter conviction only prohibited reckless
homicide, the majority held that Wood’s conviction did not count for
purposes of sentence enhancement. 102
In addition, the court explicitly refrained from using a modified
categorical approach to sentencing. 103 The court explained that the
modified categorical approach only applies when a statute is
divisible, 104 and a statute is only divisible when it “creates several
crimes or a single crime with several modes of commission.” 105
“Modes of commission” was specifically limited to conduct that was
explicitly identified in the statute.106 Thus, because Illinois’s
involuntary manslaughter statute did not specify modes of
commission, the court did not consider the involuntary manslaughter
statute to be divisible. 107
Chief Judge Easterbrook, joined by Judges Posner and Tinder,
wrote a dissent that sharply criticized Begay and he urged the Court to
create a more concrete list of violent felonies instead of an open-ended
test. 108 Chief Judge Easterbrook reminded the Court that “[s]tates did
not write their statutes with Begay in mind.” 109 He further questioned
“[h]ow can it be that burglary is a crime of violence, even though
people are rarely injured in burglaries, and homicide is not, even
though a person’s death is an element of the offense?” 110
The dissent argued that the lower court should have been able to
look at the charging documents and consider the defendant’s
conduct. 111 The dissent rationalized this approach in light of the
101

Id.
Id. at 413.
103
Id.
104
Id.
105
Id.
106
Id.
107
Id.
108
See id. at 413 (Easterbrook, C.J., dissenting).
109
Id.
110
Id. at 414.
111
Id.
102

86
https://scholarship.kentlaw.iit.edu/seventhcircuitreview/vol5/iss1/4

16

Schackart: Finding Intent Without <em>Mens Rea</em>: A Modified Categorical

SEVENTH CIRCUIT REVIEW

Volume 5, Issue 1

Fall 2009

categorical approach by arguing that as long as there is some question
as to what part of a statute the defendant violated, even if that question
is irrelevant to ultimate guilt (such as the difference between
burglarizing a house and a boat), the sentencing court should be
allowed to look at the documents. 112 The dissent’s opinion was best
summed up by the following:
Woods dropped a five-week-old baby on his head, then shook
the comatose child to death. That is purposeful, violent, and
aggressive conduct. The possibility that Woods did not intend
to drop the child need not detain us; the state statute requires
some knowing conduct, a standard satisfied by the shaking if
not the dropping. (The state judge did not pin this down,
because it was not relevant as a matter of state law.) The
Woods panel concludes that recklessness does not meet
Begay’s requirement of intentional conduct, but [another
case] holds that criminal recklessness—the kind involved
here—is a form of intent, and I think it likely that the Justices
will deem it sufficient for recidivism enhancements too.113
In contrast to the majority, the dissent focused on the defendant’s
conduct as opposed to his mens rea. 114 The dissent saw Woods’s
activity as falling within the purposeful, violent, and aggressive
conduct that the Court meant to target. 115
In contrast to the majority, the dissent stated that the statute of
conviction did not have to be divisible in order for a modified
categorical approach to apply. 116 The dissent argued that, under
Taylor, a court should be allowed to consult the charging papers and
112

Id. at 416.
Id.
114
Compare id. at 410 (majority opinion) with id. at 416 (Easterbrook, C.J.,
dissenting).
115
See id. at 416 (“[T]he kind [of intent] involved here . . . is a form of intent,
and I think it likely that the Justices will deem it sufficient for recidivism
enhancements . . . .” (Easterbrook, C.J., dissenting) (emphasis in original)).
116
See id. at 414.
113
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plea colloquy in order to discover whether a defendant burglarized a
house or a barn, even though such a distinction is irrelevant under the
generic burglary statute. 117 Similarly, how Woods killed his son was
ultimately irrelevant for conviction under the involuntary
manslaughter statute, but it could be relevant for purposes of sentence
enhancement. 118
Furthermore, the dissent advocated for a more flexible approach
to sentencing under the Guidelines because of their advisory nature. 119
Because the Guidelines were not mandatory, and a judge could have
therefore imposed a heightened sentence regardless of what the
Guidelines suggested, the dissent asked: “why employ elaborate rules
about ‘divisibility’ and ‘recklessness’ that the district judge may elect
to bypass in the end?” 120
II.

CAN A MENS REA OF RECKLESSNESS EVER
BE PURPOSEFUL UNDER BEGAY?

At first glance, it seems crimes requiring a mens rea of
recklessness would never satisfy the Begay test because acting
recklessly, by definition, is not the same as acting with intent. 121 As
explained above, that is the view the Seventh Circuit adopted in Smith
and reaffirmed in Woods. 122 However, a circuit split has developed
with regard to this question. While some circuits have followed
reasoning similar to that used in Woods, other courts have held that a
mens rea of recklessness, or even no mens rea at all, is sufficient to
117

Id. at 415 ( “[A] third kind of statute provides that ‘any person who enters a
building with intent to commit a felony therein’ commits burglary. There’s nothing
‘divisible’ about that law: the word ‘building’ covers barns, ships, and dwellings.
Yet Taylor says that here, too, the sentencing judge may look at the charging papers
or guilty-plea colloquy to see whether the person was convicted of entering a house
rather than a barn.”).
118
Id.
119
Id. at 418.
120
Id.
121
Compare 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/4–6 (West 2009), with 720 ILL.
COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/4–4 (West 2009).
122
See discussion supra Part I.C.
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meet the Begay test. 123 In addition, the Fourth Circuit Court of
Appeals adopted a modified categorical approach when confronted
with a defendant who may have committed his crime recklessly. 124
A. Circuits Holding that Recklessness Can Never Meet the
“Purposeful” Requirement for a Violent Felony Under the ACCA
or USSG
When considering the Court’s decision in Begay, several circuits
have held that a predicate offense that has a mens rea of recklessness
cannot count as a crime of violence.125 For example, in United States
v. Gray, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals held that a conviction for
reckless endangerment under New York state law 126 did not qualify as
the type of purposeful, aggressive, conduct that the Court in Begay
hoped to target. 127
While the Second Circuit acknowledged that behavior sufficient
to be criminalized as reckless endangerment “com[es] close to
crossing the threshold into purposeful conduct,”128 the court in Gray
ultimately concluded that reckless acts could not be considered
intentional. 129 In support of its conclusion, the court stated that “Begay
places a strong emphasis on intentional-purposeful-conduct as a
prerequisite for a crime to be considered similar in kind to [burglary,
arson, extortion, and the use of explosives].” 130 Furthermore, the Gray
court noted that the Court offered the crime of recklessly tampering
123

Compare discussion infra Part II.A with discussion infra Part II.B.
See discussion infra Part II.C.
125
See United States v. Gray, 535 F.3d 128 (2d Cir. 2008); United States v.
Baker, 559 F.3d 443 (6th Cir. 2009).
126
The defendant was convicted under New York Penal Law § 120.25 which
stated that “[a] person is guilty of reckless endangerment in the first degree when,
under circumstances evincing a depraved indifference to human life, he recklessly
engages in conduct which creates a grave risk of death to another person.” N.Y.
PENAL LAW § 120.25 (2009).
127
535 F.3d at 131–32.
128
Id. at 132.
129
Id.
130
Id. at 131–32.
124
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with consumer products in violation of 18 U.S.C. 1365(a) 131 as an
example of a crime that would not be considered purposeful,
aggressive, and violent. 132
Similarly, the Sixth Circuit held that reckless endangerment was
not a violent felony under the ACCA. 133 Post-Begay, the Sixth Circuit
was forced to reconsider its position that reckless endangerment
qualified as a violent felony. 134 A mere year beforehand, but before
Begay, the Sixth Circuit had decided United States v. Bailey, in which
it held that reckless endangerment was a violent felony because it
posed a serious risk of physical harm to another person. 135 The Bailey
court reasoned that a predicate conviction for reckless endangerment
should enhance the sentence of a defendant because “no scenario
exists in which an individual could commit felony reckless
endangerment without creating a serious risk of harm to
others . . . .” 136
However, in United States v. Baker, the Sixth Circuit
reconsidered its holding in light of Begay and held that reckless
endangerment did not qualify as a violent felony.137 The court held
that Begay stood for the proposition that the residual clause of the
ACCA and USSG only applied to crimes that were similar to burglary
and arson instead of every crime that presented a serious potential risk
of physical injury to another. 138 Accordingly, while the Sixth Circuit
was willing to admit that reckless endangerment posed a serious risk,
it ultimately concluded that the crime was not purposeful and thus not
a violent felony. 139 The court stated that “the offense does not involve
131

A person is guilty of violating this statute if he recklessly “disregard[s] . . .
the risk that another person will be placed in danger of death or bodily injury and
under circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to such risk, tampers with any
consumer product.” 18 U.S.C. § 1356(a) (2006).
132
Gray, 535 F.3d at 132 n.3.
133
See United States v. Baker, 559 F.3d 443, 452 (6th Cir. 2009).
134
Id.
135
264 Fed. App’x 480, 482 (6th Cir. 2008).
136
Id.
137
Baker, 559 F.3d at 453.
138
Id. at 452.
139
Id. at 453.
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the type of ‘purposeful, violent, and aggressive’ conduct as burglary,
arson, extortion, or the use of explosives . . . . Rather, on its face the
statute criminalizes only reckless behavior.” 140
While neither the Second Circuit nor the Sixth Circuit explicitly
stated that a mens rea of recklessness could never meet the Begay
standard, the reasoning utilized above strongly suggested that a
criminal statute with only a mens rea of recklessness or negligence
was unlikely to count for purposes of sentence enhancement under the
ACCA and the USSG in those circuits. Furthermore, courts
interpreting these decisions from the Second, Sixth, and Seventh
Circuits have recognized the intentional/purposeful mens rea
requirement for triggering sentence enhancements under the ACCA
and USSG. 141 Thus, the mens rea of a statute may be the most defining
element when determining whether a statute is a violent felony under
the ACCA or USSG. 142
B. Circuits Holding that a Mens Rea of Recklessness or Strict
Liability Crimes Do Satisfy the “Purposeful” Requirement of Begay
At the other end of the spectrum are those circuits holding that a
mens rea of recklessness or crimes without a specified mens rea can be
sufficiently purposeful to constitute a violent felony under the ACCA
and the USSG. 143 These circuits mainly rely upon the fact that there is

140

Id. (emphasis added) (internal citations omitted).
See, e.g., United States v. Jones, 574 F.3d 546, 551 (8th Cir. 2009) (“Jones
is correct in asserting that some circuits have interpreted Begay to limit the mens rea
a crime must have in order to qualify as a violent felony.” (citing United States v.
Smith, 544 F.3d 781, 785–86 (7th Cir.2008) (holding that post-Begay crimes of
recklessness are not violent felonies under the ACCA); United States v. Gray, 535
F.3d 128, 132 (2d Cir.2008) (holding that "reckless endangerment" is not a crime of
violence because the statute “on its face does not criminalize intentional or deliberate
conduct."))).
142
See id.
143
See United States v. Zuniga, 553 F.3d 1330, 1336 (10th Cir. 2009); United
States v. Polk, 577 F.3d 515, 519 (3d Cir. 2009).
141
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some intentional or purposeful act that occurs during the commission
of the crime. 144
For example, in United States v. Zuniga, the Tenth Circuit held
that possession of a deadly weapon in prison 145 constituted a violent
felony under the ACCA. 146 The Tenth Circuit immediately noticed
that the statute criminalized reckless conduct and, as a result,
acknowledged that the defendant’s possession of a deadly weapon did
not have to be deliberate or intentional under the statute. 147 The court
then stated that “the Begay test specifically requires that the crime in
question ‘typically’ involve purposeful conduct. It is reasonable to
surmise that those who possess deadly weapons in a penal institution
typically intend to possess them.” 148 The Zuniga court also examined
how the state courts interpreted the Texas statute. 149 Noting that one of
the elements the State had to show was that the accused “possessed the
weapon knowingly or intentionally,” the court had an easier time
concluding that a conviction for possessing a deadly weapon in prison
qualified as a violent felony. 150
In Zuniga, the Tenth Circuit also justified its opinion based on its
conclusion that possessing a deadly weapon was more similar to
burglary, arson, etc., than driving under the influence. 151 The court
reasoned that:

144

Id.
See TEX PENAL CODE ANN. § 46.10 (West 2003) (“A person commits an
offense if, while in a penal institution, he (1) intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly:
(1) carries on or about his person a deadly weapon; or (2) possesses or conceals a
deadly weapon in a penal institution.”).
146
553 F.3d at 1336.
147
Id. at 1334.
148
Id. (internal citations omitted).
149
Id.
150
Id. at 1334–35 (citing Wilson v. State of Texas, No. 13-04-00298-CR, 2007
Tex. App. LEXIS 4332, at *6 (Tex. Crim. App. 13th Dist. May 31, 2007)
(unpublished)). Of course, while the Tenth Circuit relied on this opinion in its
decision, it should be noted that Wilson was unpublished and not binding on any
state court.
151
Id. at 1335.
145
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The Court in Begay determined that driving under the
influence was not a purposeful crime because it was similar
to a strict liability offense, ‘criminalizing conduct in respect
to which the offender need not have any criminal intent at
all.’ Possession of a deadly weapon in prison is not a strict
liability crime, because it requires either intentional or
reckless behavior. In terms of purpose, it is therefore not
analogous to driving under the influence. 152
In a very similar case, the Third Circuit also concluded that
possession of a deadly weapon was purposeful. 153 Interestingly, the
statute the defendant was convicted under, 18 U.S.C. §1791(a)(2), was
a strict liability offense and had no mens rea requirement. 154
Specifically, 18 U.S.C. §1791(a)(2) provided that “[w]hoever . . .
being an inmate of a prison, makes, possesses, or obtains, or attempts
to make or obtain, a prohibited object shall be punished as provided in
subsection (b) of this section.” 155 In other words, one could
theoretically be convicted under this statute for negligently or
recklessly possessing a prohibited object (not even a necessarily a
deadly object, just one that is prohibited). 156 In looking at the
“purposeful” component of the Begay test, the Third Circuit
summarily declared that “[w]hile possessing a weapon in prison is
purposeful, in that we may assume one who possesses a shank intends
that possession, it cannot properly be characterized as conduct that is
itself aggressive or violent.” 157 Thus, while the Tenth and Third
Circuits similarly found that possessing a weapon in prison was
purposeful, they differ with regard to whether that possession was
aggressive and/or violent. 158

152

Id. (internal citations omitted).
United States v. Polk, 577 F.3d 515, 519 (3d Cir. 2009).
154
See 18 U.S.C. § 1791(a)(2) (2006).
155
Id.
156
See id.
157
Polk, 577 F.3d at 519.
158
Id.
153
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C. Recklessness May Qualify as Purposefulness:
The Modified Categorical Approach
A frequent problem courts encounter when sentencing a
defendant under the ACCA or Guidelines is when a defendant can be
convicted under a statute for acting purposefully or recklessly. 159 The
Fourth Circuit was faced with just such a dilemma in U.S. v.
Roseboro. 160
In Roseboro, the predicate felony at issue was failure to stop for a
blue light. 161 The statute at issue criminalized the “failure” to stop for
a blue light but did not specify a particular mens rea. 162 Specifically,
the statute stated:
In the absence of mitigating circumstances, it is unlawful for
a motor vehicle driver, while driving on a road, street, or
highway of the State, to fail to stop when signaled by a law
enforcement vehicle by means of a siren or flashing light. An
attempt to increase the speed of a vehicle or in other manner
avoid the pursuing law enforcement vehicle when signaled by
a siren or flashing light is prima facie evidence of a violation
of this section. Failure to see the flashing light or hear the
siren does not excuse a failure to stop when the distance
between the vehicles and other road conditions are such that
it would be reasonable for a driver to hear or see the signals
from the law enforcement vehicle. 163
The Fourth Circuit held that the wording of the statute placed the
sentencing court in a dilemma, because a defendant could intentionally
or unintentionally violate the statute. 164 Noting that the statute was
“categorically overbroad” the court remanded to the district court and
159

See, e.g., United States v. Roseboro, 551 F.3d 226, 235 (4th Cir. 2009).
Id.
161
Id. at 228.
162
Id. at 234–35.
163
S.C. CODE ANN. § 56-6-750 (West 2009).
164
Roseboro, 551 F.3d at 234–35.
160
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allowed the court to consult additional materials to discover whether
the defendant had acted intentionally. 165
Thus, in Roseboro, the court took a statute that was “strictliability like” in nature and, instead of determining that the conduct
was not purposeful, remanded the case to allow the district court to
determine whether the defendant’s conduct was intentional. 166
III.

IN ORDER TO FULFILL THE GOALS OF THE ACCA AND
THE USSG, JUDGES NEED MORE DISCRETION TO DETERMINE
PURPOSEFULNESS

As explained above, one of the major goals of the ACCA was to
keep violent, repeat offenders off the streets. 167 The Guidelines have
the additional aspiration of trying to maintain uniformity in
sentencing. 168 A mens rea approach does not best fulfill these goals.
On the other hand, the Tenth and Third Circuit’s approach is
insufficient because it potentially allows non-purposeful conduct to be
elevated to the level of a violent felony. Instead, judges should be
allowed more discretion to look at the record and determine whether
the conduct at issue demonstrates that the defendant intended to act in
a violent and aggressive manner. Thus, courts should use, and should
be allowed to use, the modified categorical approach suggested by the
court in Roseboro and the dissent in Woods.
A. The Mens Rea Approach is Unsatisfactory
Limiting violent felonies to only those crimes that require a mens
rea of recklessness does not accomplish Congress’s goals of (1)
neutralizing violent, repeat offenders and (2) achieving uniformity in
sentencing.

165

Id. at 240.
Id.
167
See discussion supra Part I.A.
168
See discussion supra Part I.B.
166
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1. Too Many Offenses Are Left Out of the Definition of Violent
Felony, Thus Working Against the Goal of Punishing Serial Offenders
Considering that one of the major goals of Congress in enacting
the ACCA and creating the Sentencing Commission was to neutralize
violent repeat offenders, the mens rea approach is unable to achieve
this goal. Specifically, two of the most heinous crimes, manslaughter
and sexual assault might not qualify as violent felonies or crimes of
violence under the Seventh Circuit’s mens rea approach. 169 Thus, an
individual who commits any combination of involuntary manslaughter
and sexual assault multiple times might still not be considered a career
offender under the ACCA or USSG. 170
Looking first at involuntary manslaughter, the Seventh Circuit’s
holding in Woods asserts that involuntary manslaughter is not a violent
felony. 171 However, such a holding is directly in conflict with the
position of the Sentencing Commission, which has included
manslaughter on its list of enumerated predicate felonies. 172 As the
Commission was created, in part, as a response to Congress’s desire to
incapacitate serious offenders, the Commission’s position on what
crimes are violent felonies is persuasive. 173 The Seventh Circuit’s

169

See United States v. Woods, 576 F.3d 400, 412–13 (7th Cir. 2009); 720 ILL.
COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/12–13 (West 2009). As explained in Part I.C, the Seventh
Circuit held that involuntary manslaughter under Illinois law does not qualify as a
violent felony under Begay. See discussion supra Part I.C. Further, Illinois’s
criminal sexual assault statute does not specify a mens rea, and thus is a strict
liability offense, so a conviction under the statute would not be purposeful under a
mens rea approach. See infra note 182 and accompanying text.
170
See id.
171
Woods, 576 F.3d at 412–13; see discussion supra Part I.C.
172
U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 4B1.2(a) cmt. n.1 (2009).
173
See United States v. Herrick, 545 F.3d 53, 60 (1st Cir. 2008) (“We note that
the commentary to U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(a) includes manslaughter as a crime of violence
without distinguishing between voluntary and involuntary manslaughter, arguably
suggesting that the mens rea for the crime is not determinative.”); see also United
States v. Camilo, 71 F.3d 984, 988 (1st Cir. 1995) (citing to the Commission’s
commentary to support its position); United States v. Wilson, 993 F.2d 214, 217
(11th Cir. 1993) (citing commentary from the Commission to support its holding that
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mens rea approach, in leading to an opposite result, does not fulfill the
goals of the ACCA and the USSG.
Arguably, a distinction could be drawn between voluntary and
involuntary manslaughter. For example, when considering a bill that
would impose mandatory life imprisonment for individuals convicted
of three violent felonies, the House of Representatives proposed that
the term “serious violent felony” meant “[a] Federal or State offense,
by whatever designation and wherever committed, consisting of . . .
manslaughter other than involuntary manslaughter.” 174
However, even in taking this definition into account, there are
important considerations to keep in mind. First, the Commission did
not make the distinction between voluntary and involuntary
manslaughter. 175 Second, the definition above is for a “serious violent
felony” as opposed to a “violent felony,” and the ACCA only concerns
itself with violent felonies. 176 Consequently, there is no indication that
Congress meant to remove involuntary manslaughter from the list of
violent felonies simply because it was committed recklessly.
Similarly, some sex crimes will likely not be considered
“purposeful” under the mens rea approach because these crimes do not
specify a mens rea. 177 Criminal Sexual Assault, for example, is
defined in Illinois as:
§ 12-13. Criminal Sexual Assault.
(a) The accused commits criminal sexual assault if he or she:
(1) commits an act of sexual penetration by the use of force
or threat of force; or

reasonably foreseeable consequences of fraud can be taken into account when
sentencing).
174
H.R. REP. NO. 103–463, at 2 (1994).
175
See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 4B1.2(a) cmt. n.1 (2009).
176
See 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(1) (2006).
177
See 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/12–13 (West 2009); 720 ILL. COMP. STAT.
ANN. 5/12–14.1 (West 2009). But see United States v. Patterson, 576 F.3d 431, 442
(7th Cir. 2009) (holding that knowingly transporting a minor across state lines for
prostitution is a crime of violence).
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(2) commits an act of sexual penetration and the accused
knew that the victim was unable to understand the nature of
the act or was unable to give knowing consent; or
(3) commits an act of sexual penetration with a victim who
was under 18 years of age when the act was committed and
the accused was a family member; or
(4) commits an act of sexual penetration with a victim who
was at least 13 years of age but under 18 years of age when
the act was committed and the accused was 17 years of age or
over and held a position of trust, authority or supervision in
relation to the victim. 178
Of the various definitions, only one, §12-13(a)(2) has a mens rea
element to it. 179 According to Woods, while a court could engage in a
modified categorical approach to discover what offense the defendant
committed, the court could not take the facts learned from the record
of conviction to determine whether the defendant acted
purposefully. 180 Instead, the court would be restricted to the statutory
language. 181 Thus if a defendant committed (a)(1)—sexual penetration
by the use of force or threat of force—the court could not determine
whether he had acted purposefully because there is no mens rea
element. The statute, in fact, reads like a strict liability statute. As a
result, the Seventh Circuit would be precluded from determining that a
defendant had acted purposefully, and thus the rapist would not be
subjected to an enhanced sentence—even if he was to rape two more
times. 182
178
179

720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/12–13 (West 2009).
720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/12–13(a)(2) (West 2009) (“the accused

knew”).
180

See United States v. Woods, 576 F.3d 400, 405 (7th Cir. 2009).
See id.
182
In both Woods and Patterson, the Seventh Circuit used the strict liability
statute at issue in Begay to point out that the Supreme Court did not intend to
enhance sentences for those crimes where the offender did not act with criminal
intent. See id. at 409; Patterson, 576 F.3d at 441. Thus, while the Seventh Circuit
has never explicitly held that strict liability statutes do not meet the Begay test, such
a holding can be inferred from the court’s reasoning in Woods and Patterson.
181
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Predatory criminal sexual assault of a child functions in a
similar way. The statute reads:
§ 12-14.1. Predatory criminal sexual assault of a child.
(a) The accused commits predatory criminal sexual assault of
a child if:
(1) the accused was 17 years of age or over and commits an
act of sexual penetration with a victim who was under 13
years of age when the act was committed; or
(1.1) the accused was 17 years of age or over and, while
armed with a firearm, commits an act of sexual penetration
with a victim who was under 13 years of age when the act
was committed; or
(1.2) the accused was 17 years of age or over and commits an
act of sexual penetration with a victim who was under 13
years of age when the act was committed and, during the
commission of the offense, the accused personally discharged
a firearm; or
(2) the accused was 17 years of age or over and commits an
act of sexual penetration with a victim who was under 13
years of age when the act was committed and the accused
caused great bodily harm to the victim that:
(A) resulted in permanent disability; or
(B) was life threatening; or
(3) the accused was 17 years of age or over and commits an
act of sexual penetration with a victim who was under 13
years of age when the act was committed and the accused
delivered (by injection, inhalation, ingestion, transfer of
possession, or any other means) to the victim without his or
her consent, or by threat or deception, and for other than
medical purposes, any controlled substance.
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Again, a review of the statute finds no mens rea element. 183
Because no criminal intent is specified in this statute, and any of these
offenses could theoretically be committed purposefully, knowingly, or
recklessly, the Seventh Circuit would be precluded from finding any
of these offenses to be crimes of violence. 184
Accordingly, the mens rea approach fails to impose larger
sentences on those individuals who commit some of the more
disturbing crimes: homicide (in the form of involuntary manslaughter)
and criminal sexual assault. Such a result seems inconsistent with the
goals of the ACCA and USSG, and is in direct opposition to the
Commission’s intent. 185
2. A Mens Rea Approach Creates a Lack of Uniformity
The other articulated goal of Congress in creating the
Commission was to achieve uniformity in sentencing. 186 However,
under a mens rea approach, defendants with similar levels of
culpability end up with widely disparate sentences.
Two cases, United States v. Woods and United States v. Hudson,
illustrate this dilemma. As discussed in Part I, the defendant in Woods
was convicted of involuntary manslaughter after recklessly shaking his
disabled infant son and causing his death. 187 Although irrelevant for
our purposes, there was other evidence that the baby had been abused
and had died from blunt trauma to the head. 188
In Hudson, one of the defendant’s predicate offenses was fleeing
a police officer. 189 Specifically, Hudson was guilty of fleeing “while
183

The Model Penal Code identifies four levels of culpability: purpose,
knowledge, recklessness, and negligence. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(2) (2009).
None of these levels of culpability are identified in the statute.
184
See supra note 182 and accompanying text; see also MODEL PENAL CODE
§ 2.02(3) (2009) (stating that if a statute does not specify a mens rea, a defendant is
guilty of the offense if he commits it purposely, knowingly, or recklessly).
185
U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 4B1.2(a) cmt. n.1 (2009).
186
See discussion supra Part I.B.
187
See discussion supra Part I.C.
188
United States v. Woods, 576 F.3d 400, 402 (7th Cir. 2009).
189
United States v. Hudson, 577 F.3d 883, 884 (8th Cir. 2009).
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operating a motor vehicle on city streets ‘at excessive speeds and
failing to stop for stop signs.’” 190 Later, the defendant was also
convicted of being a felon in possession of a firearm. 191 He argued that
he was not subject to the sentence enhancement because his prior
conviction for fleeing a police officer was not a crime of violence. 192
Specifically, he argued that the statute of conviction did not require an
intent to kill or harm, and, as a result, did not require
purposefulness. 193 In other words, Hudson argued that his behavior
was not purposeful because he did not intend to expose anyone to
harm. 194
The Eighth Circuit disagreed. 195 In looking at the statute of
conviction, the court noted that Hudson was charged with knowingly
fleeing a police officer. 196 Accordingly, the court concluded that
“knowingly fleeing a police officer who is attempting to make an
arrest is purposeful conduct that falls within the ‘otherwise involves’
clause of § 4B1.2(a) as construed by Begay.” 197 Consequently, by
looking only at the mens rea of the statute of conviction, Hudson was
given an additional fifteen-year sentence for knowingly fleeing a
police office when his actual conduct may not have presented a
“serious potential risk of injury to another.” 198
The differing results in Woods and Hudson appear anomalous.
Both Woods and Hudson consciously engaged in an act that
represented a callous indifference toward human life. Surely, one
defendant is not more likely to point a gun and pull a trigger than the
other. Yet Hudson was sentenced to an additional fifteen years, while
Woods was not. This is especially alarming in light of the fact that
Woods’s action actually did claim a human life while Hudson’s did
not.
190

Id.
Id.
192
Id.
193
Id. at 885–86.
194
See id.
195
Id. at 886.
196
Id.
197
Id.
198
Id.; U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 4B1.2(a) (2009).
191
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The different results in Hudson and Woods demonstrate that a
mens rea approach to purposefulness goes against the goal of
uniformity in sentencing. Arguably, uniformity is only a goal with
regard to two defendants who are convicted of the same crime, but the
goals of the Commission state that the Commission is charged with
ensuring certainty in sentencing with regard to similar defendants who
have a similar criminal background. 199 Since the mens rea approach
concentrates solely on the mens rea required for conviction without
taking into account any of the background facts of a case, such an
approach creates severe disparities in sentencing between similarlysituated defendants.
B. The Tenth Circuit’s Approach is Inconsistent with Begay
Even as the Seventh Circuit’s approach is too narrow, the Tenth
Circuit’s rule is too broad. As stated above, the Tenth Circuit found
purposefulness when the statute of conviction criminalized behavior
that was “typically” committed with purpose. 200 However, this
overlooks the fact that some defendants could be convicted who did
not intentionally engage in any aggressive or violent behavior.
A simple hypothetical demonstrates this point. If Joe Inmate
believes that someone is waiting for him in the cafeteria, he may bring
a sharpened toothbrush with him to defend himself. Nothing, in fact,
happens, and Joe means to get rid of the weapon, but he forgets that he
has it on his person. Later, during a routine search, guards discover the
toothbrush. While Joe did not intend to have the weapon on him at the
time he was caught, his offense would still be considered a violent
felony under the ACCA.
Of course, it could be argued that the inmate intended to possess
the weapon earlier, or that he committed an intentional act that lead to
him recklessly committing a crime. However, the Seventh Circuit’s
response to this argument is sound. In essence, the Seventh Circuit
recognized that every unintentional act begins with an intentional
199
200

28 U.S.C.A. § 991(b)(1)(B) (West 2008).
United States v. Zuniga, 553 F.3d 1330, 1334 (10th Cir. 2009).
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act. 201 The Tenth Circuit’s approach thus impermissibly blurs the line
between actus reus and mens rea. 202 By finding that the purposefulness
requirement is met in one intentional act, such a holding relieves the
court of finding purpose with regard to the actual crime of conviction.
In addition, punishing those individuals who do not have the
requisite level of intent is contrary to the Court’s holding in Begay. 203
Specifically, the Court in Begay was concerned about those
individuals who might “deliberately point the gun and pull the
trigger.” 204 Indeed, one of the Court’s problems with New Mexico’s
DUI statute in Begay was that it would add a 15-year sentence
enhancement as a result of a crime where the defendant did not need to
have any criminal intent whatsoever. 205 Therefore, in cases where a
defendant could be convicted without having intentionally committed
the offense, the Tenth Circuit’s approach goes against the holding of
Begay.
C. The Modified Categorical Approach:
(Re)Introducing Discretion into Sentencing
On the surface, it is difficult to construe “recklessness” as
“purposefulness” because, as the court addressed in Woods, every
reckless result likely begins with an intentional act. 206 Yet, looking
solely at the mens rea of a statute creates unjust results that go against
the established purposes of sentencing. 207 How is one to reconcile
these results?
201

See United States v. Woods, 576 F.3d 400, 410–11 (7th Cir. 2009).
See Michael M. O’Hear, Seventh Circuit Criminal Case of the Week: What
Is a Crime of Violence?, MARQ. U. L. SCH. FACULTY BLOG, Aug. 9, 2009,
http://law.marquette.edu/facultyblog/2009/08/09/seventh-circuit-criminal-case-ofthe-week-what-is-a-crime-of-violence.
203
See Begay v. United States, 128 S. Ct. 1581, 1587 (2008).
204
Id.
205
Id. at 1586–87.
206
See United States v. Woods, 476 F.3d 400, 411 (7th Cir. 2009) (“Every
crime of recklessness necessarily requires a purposeful, volitional act that sets in
motion the later outcome.”).
207
See discussion supra Part III.A.
202
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Adherence to the categorical approach causes unjust and disparate
results in sentencing. While there are understandable reasons why
society does not want judges to be able to comb through a defendant’s
record when imposing a sentence, by not allowing judges any access
to the record of conviction it is virtually impossible to separate the
violent, career offenders from the “regular” repeat offenders. 208
Under current Court precedent, the best approach so far seems to
be the Fourth Circuit’s approach in Roseboro. In Roseboro, the Fourth
Circuit took a statute that did not specify a mens rea requirement, and
remanded the case back to the lower court to determine whether the
defendant had acted with purpose. This approach is preferable to either
the mens rea approach or the Tenth Circuit’s approach. With regard to
the sexual assault statutes described above, such an approach would
allow a sentencing judge to look at certain documents in the record to
determine whether a defendant acted purposefully. 209 Instead of
simply not allowing these crimes to count as predicate offenses, the
modified categorical approach will allow a more just and uniform
sentencing because defendants with similar degrees of guilt will
receive similar punishments. 210
The modified categorical approach could have lead to a different
result in Woods. Although the statute criminalized only reckless intent,
Wood’s conduct demonstrates an intent to commit a violent and
aggressive act. 211 As the dissent explained, “[l]ikewise a person who
drops a baby on his head, and intentionally shakes the inert body
violently, has committed an aggressive and dangerous act; the person's
208

See Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000) and Blakely v.
Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004) for a discussion of possible Sixth Amendment
concerns when judges use discretion in sentencing. However, Apprendi and its
progeny are not of concern because both of those cases dealt with judicial findings of
fact. See Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 471; Blakely, 542 U.S. at 300. A modified categorical
approach to sentencing would only use facts that have already been found by a jury
or have been admitted to by a defendant. See Woods, 576 F.3d at 415 (Easterbrook,
C.J., dissenting) (“Shepard blocks using anything other than the charging papers and
plea colloquy to establish what the defendant was convicted of.”).
209
See supra note 182 and accompanying text.
210
See discussion supra Part III.A.
211
See Woods, 576 F.3d at 417 (Easterbrook, C.J., dissenting).
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indifference to consequences should not prevent counting the
conviction.” 212 Similarly, an individual who recklessly shoots a gun
into a crowd, but does not intend to kill anyone, intentionally
committed a violent and aggressive act even though she was
unconcerned about the consequences of her act. 213
Arguably, the modified categorical approach represents a return
to the “medical” model of sentencing because judges are allowed
discretion to determine whether defendants acted purposefully. 214
Indeed, some have called for a return to some form of wholly
discretionary sentencing. 215 However, this article does not call for a
return to unfettered discretion. Instead, implementing a modified
categorical approach would alleviate concerns about disparate
sentencing while furthering the goals of the ACCA and USSG.
First, the modified categorical approach would not lead to
disparate sentencing. The Guidelines would still be in place so that
individuals convicted of a certain crimes would receive the original
sentence they would normally receive under the Guidelines. 216 The
only provision that would be affected would be the sentence
enhancement provision. 217 To the degree that judges do have more
discretion to award sentence enhancements, such discretion is
necessary to fulfill the articulated goals of the ACCA and USSG.
Furthermore, Congress never meant to entirely eradicate judicial
discretion in sentencing. 218 In fact, “the drafters of the Guidelines
212

Id.
Id.
214
See discussion supra Part I.B for a discussion on the medical model of
sentencing.
215
See Adam Lamparello, Implementing the Heartland Departure in a PostBooker World, 32 AM. J. CRIM. L. 133, 137 (2005).
216
The Application Instructions instruct district courts to calculate a
defendant’s sentence, then apply the sentence enhancement. See U.S. SENTENCING
GUIDELINES MANUAL § 1B1.1(f) (2009);Woods, 576 F.3d at 411 (“It is worth
underscoring . . . that the enhanced sentencing range under the ACCA or the career
offender guidelines is imposed in addition to any punishment that has already been
imposed on a defendant.” (emphasis in original)).
217
See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 4B1.1 (2009).
218
See S. REP. No. 98-225, at 77 (1983), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3182,
3260 (stating that judges were to consider all the purposes of sentencing when
213

105
Published by Scholarly Commons @ IIT Chicago-Kent College of Law, 2009

35

Seventh Circuit Review, Vol. 5, Iss. 1 [2009], Art. 4

SEVENTH CIRCUIT REVIEW

Volume 5, Issue 1

Fall 2009

regime envisioned an important role for judges . . . . As judges applied
the Guidelines, they were supposed to highlight issues and concerns
that the Guidelines had not addressed, in effect, to create a common
law of sentencing in the interstices of the Guidelines.” 219 Additionally,
the Guidelines themselves allow a sentencing judge to consider any
other policies or factors that would allow them to adjust the
defendant’s sentence. 220 Therefore, because discretion has always
been, and continues to be, an integral part of sentencing, the modified
categorical approach should not be rejected simply because it allows
more discretion than the mens rea approach.
Second, the modified categorical approach is more in line with
Congress’s intent. Congress meant to target repeat, violent
offenders. 221 Shaking a baby to death is certainly violent. 222 Congress
also wanted to achieve greater uniformity in sentencing, and the
modified categorical approach, more than a mens rea approach, allows
for defendants with similar degrees of culpability to receive similar
punishments. 223 Instead being confined to the mens rea of a statute,
courts will be able to reach a common sense decision as to whether the
defendant acted purposefully. Thus, instead of two wildly different
results for defendants who engaged in equally culpable behavior,
courts can determine, for example, that in this involuntary
manslaughter case, the defendant purposefully committed a violent
and aggressive act, although she was reckless with regard to the
eventual outcome.
CONCLUSION
Manslaughter, voluntary or involuntary, results in the loss of a
human life. Woods admitted to dropping his mentally handicapped
imposing a sentence); United States v. Jaber, 362 F. Supp. 2d 365, 372–73 (D. Mass.
2005).
219
Jaber, 362 F. Supp. 2d at 373.
220
See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL, § 1B1.1(i) (2009).
221
See discussion supra Part I.A.
222
See United States v. Woods, 576 F.3d 400, 416 (7th Cir. 2009)
(Easterbrook, C.J., dissenting).
223
See discussion supra Part II.B; see also discussion supra Part III.A.2.
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five-week old son and shaking him to death. As the dissent in Woods
realized, this, by its nature is an intentional, aggressive, and violent
act. 224 Ironically, by getting caught up in the mens rea of the actual
statute of conviction, courts lose the ability to target repeat offenders
who have the same level of mental culpability.

224

See Woods, 576 F.3d at 416 (Easterbrook, C.J., dissenting).
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